Good news for those who donate*: starting in tax year 2026, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBB, also seen as OBBBA) changes the federal tax rules around charitable giving in a way that makes a charitable deduction available to many more taxpayers than before. This explainer summarizes what changed, who benefits, what got harder for itemizers, and why charitable giving (money and time) still matters at a national scale. [1][2][3]
What is the OBBB, and what changed?
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBB) is a major federal law enacted in 2025 with major changes to the Tax Code including several provisions affecting charitable giving apply starting tax year 2026. [1][2]
The key changes for Charitable Donations:
Before (through 2025): If you took the standard deduction, you generally could not deduct charitable donations on your federal return.
After (starting 2026): Many standard deduction filers can deduct a limited amount of qualifying charitable giving, while itemizers face new thresholds that can make some giving less deductible than before. [3][4]
Who can donate?
So what is the big deal, many people donate right? True, but the catch was that only taxpayers who itemized deductions generally received a federal tax deduction for charitable gifts.
However, most taxpayers do not itemize. IRS Statistics of Income data for tax year 2022 shows 88.6% of returns claimed the standard deduction. [5] In plain terms: roughly 9 out of 10 filers were typically not eligible for a charitable deduction simply because they didn’t itemize, even if they donated. This is even bigger because while many people donate across all income levels, generally only higher income individuals with more itemized deductions used the itemize form, and therefore almost 90% of filers who could most use the deduction were left out.
The Good news – that all changes with OBBB: starting in 2026, you don’t need to be a wealthy itemizer to get a deduction, standard deduction filers can now deduct some charitable giving again (within limits and rules). [3]
Pre vs Post OBBB: Donation Rules Changes
Topic
Pre-OBBB (baseline, through 2025)
Post-OBBB (starts 2026)
Standard deduction filers (non-itemizers)
Usually no federal deduction for charitable donations if you don’t itemize
New non-itemizer charitable deduction for cash gifts: up to $1,000 (single) or $2,000 (married filing jointly); some contributions (such as to certain vehicles like donor-advised funds) are excluded from this specific deduction [3]
Itemizers – when deductions start counting
Charitable deductions generally counted from the first dollar (subject to normal rules)
New 0.5% of AGI floor: itemizers generally only deduct contributions above 0.5% of AGI [4]
High-income itemizers (top bracket)
Benefit generally tracks marginal tax rate (subject to normal limits)
Tax value of itemized charitable deductions capped at 35% for top-bracket filers (slightly reduces the marginal tax value vs a 37% bracket) [3][4]
What this means (simply)
Good news for Standard deduction filers (~90% of Americans)
Because most filers take the standard deduction (88.6% in TY2022), the new rule expands the ability to get a federal tax benefit for charitable giving to the mainstream filing path. [5]
This does not mean everyone will claim it, or that every gift qualifies. But it does mean millions more households can get at least some tax recognition for giving without itemizing. [3]
A Slight Hurdle for Itemized deduction filers
If you itemize, the new 0.5% of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) floor means a portion of charitable giving may be treated as not deductible for federal income tax purposes, because only gifts above the threshold count. [4]
A modest change for Top-bracket donors
For filers in the highest Income Tax bracket, the maximum tax value of charitable deductions is capped at 35%. Practically, that can slightly reduce the tax savings associated with a deductible gift for those taxpayers. [3][4]
Quick working examples (easy math)
Example A: Standard deduction filer (single), cash gifts
You take the standard deduction.
You donate $600 cash to a qualifying charity in 2026.
Result: You can deduct $600 (because it’s under the $1,000 cap), assuming the gift qualifies under the new rules. [3]
If you donate $1,500, the deductible amount under this rule is generally $1,000 (the cap). [3]
Example B: Itemizer with the new floor
You itemize.
Your AGI is $200,000.
You donate $2,000.
0.5% of AGI = $200,000 x 0.005 = $1,000. Deductible amount = $2,000 – $1,000 = $1,000. [4]
Giving in America Matters!
Americans give a lot (money + time) to charity – A LOT! We are a Nation of people that care, and want to help put our best foot forward. In total, Americans contribute over $700 Billion in annual charity value. To put that in perspective, there are less than 25 countries whose entire economies are bigger than that, and that is JUST for charity. [8]
Money: U.S. charitable giving totaled $592.5 billion in 2024 (Giving USA). [6]
Time: About 60.7 million adults volunteered, contributing 4.1 billion hours, with an estimated economic value around $122.9 billion (standardized valuation approach). [7]
The Charitable giving tax rule changes are a big deal, enabling almost 90% of the population to donate and get something back for it in their taxes. This could open a whole new avenue of both charity, and personal and societal benefits over time giving equal access to the benefits of Charitable contributions to everyone, not just the wealthy.
Bottom line: OBBB shifts how the tax system recognizes giving, and the 2026 update expands access to a charitable deduction for the large group of taxpayers who use the standard deduction. [3][5]
*This is not tax advice, please consult with your tax specialist or accountant to discuss these and any other tax related issues to determine if they are appropriate for your situation.
[8] International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2025. World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database (October 2025 Edition): Gross domestic product, current prices (NGDPD), billions of U.S. dollars. Accessed February 6, 2026. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO (IMF)
For most of U.S. history, tariffs were Congress’s domain and primarily a way to raise revenue. Article I of the Constitution assigns taxing and tariff powers to Congress, and for half our countries history Tariffs were the Federal government’s main revenue source. Over the 20th century, however, Congress frustrated by the slow, politicized nature of tariff-making began delegating authority to the Executive branch so trade policy could be negotiated dynamically. On Wednesday (11/5/25) the Supreme Court began the review of President Trump’s recent tariff program and the review will test how far that delegation can stretch, especially when tariffs evolve from a revenue instrument to a lever of commerce, national security, and geopolitical bargaining (e.g., fentanyl control or strategic tech limits). [1][2]
Evolving roles of Congress and the White House
Tariffs were the exclusive domain of Congress, composing long schedules with changes occurring over years. The shift the Executive office has occurred progressively and deliberately beginning with the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), which let presidents cut or raise tariffs up to 50% (relative to Smoot-Hawley) through executive agreements which proved faster than treaties and more adaptable than statute. The RTAA embedded reciprocity and helped create multi lateral concessions via the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT’s) most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, allowing negotiated tariff cuts with one partner to benefit all. This was a conscious design choice: move from static tariff schedules set by statute to a nimble bargaining architecture led by the Executive. [3][4][5]
Congress later layered additional delegations: Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act (national security tariffs), Section 201 and 301 of the 1974 Trade Act (safeguards and unfair trade responses), and in 1977 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which broadly authorizes the President to regulate economic transactions during national emergencies involving foreign threats. In parallel, the GATT/WTO framework entrenched MFN and reciprocity, reinforcing executive-driven negotiating cycles rather than fixed tariff lawmaking. [6][7]
Courts have mostly OK’d Delegation
Historically, the Court has upheld substantial tariff delegations when Congress set intelligible principles and clear predicates. In Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG (1976), the Court approved presidential license fees on oil under Section 232, reading the statute as giving the President flexibility to “adjust” imports for national security once the Executive met specific preconditions. Earlier, Field v. Clark (1892) sustained conditional delegation tied to foreign tariff behavior. These cases held decades of deference by the court in trade and delegation by Congress to the Executive branch. [8][9]
The Trump era revived litigation, first around 2018 steel/aluminum actions under Section 232. Challenges like American Institute for International Steel failed; the Supreme Court denied cert, leaving Algonquin intact and the Federal Circuit generally supportive of 232 flexibility, including derivative-product tariffs. [10][11][12]
However, 2025 represents a different question: Can IEEPA (which never mentions “tariffs”) support sweeping, near-global import duties justified by emergency findings (including fentanyl and broader economic security)? The Court’s November 5, 2025 oral argument signaled skepticism from both conservative and liberal justices about reading IEEPA to authorize what looks like taxation, a traditional legislative power. Several justices pressed whether the major questions doctrine which requires explicit congressional authorization for issues of “major national significance” and consequential policy. [13][14][15][16]
That skepticism follows a procedural path: in August 2025, the Federal Circuit affirmed that IEEPA’s grant to “regulate” foreign economic transactions does not stretch to an open-ended tariff regime; the government petitioned for swift Supreme Court reversal. The present case thus squarely tees up whether “regulation” under IEEPA can include customs duties and—if so—whether that would violate the nondelegation principle absent tighter statutory limits. [17][18] (Federal Circuit Court)
From Revenue to Leverage: how purpose may shape the ruling
There is debate if Tariffs are a tax, see our article on Are Tariffs a Tax? Regardless of your opinion on if Tariffs are Taxes, in the SCOTUS review purpose matters. Clearly overtime the role of Tariffs has evolved: began as revenue; then a protection mechanism, to a tool for reciprocity, and to promote global trade. Now, modern presidents often wield them as leverage for Geopolitical positions beyond economics including reducing Fentanyl and putting checks on bad actors like Russia and North Korea, and checking China economically and militarily. Trump’s 2025 program explicitly ties duties to strategic aims: deterring fentanyl flows, reshoring supply chains, and countering adversaries’ economic-military statecraft. In that framing, tariffs function like sanctions, an area where IEEPA routinely operates. The government’s brief argues the measures are regulatory, not fiscal, and thus within IEEPA’s text and tradition. Challengers reply that once the Executive imposes broad, durable duties at the border, it is taxing without Congress. [19][20]
How might the Court sort this?
A narrow IEEPA reading (most likely): The justices could hold that IEEPA authorizes blocking, freezing, licensing, and transaction bans, but not generalized ad valorem tariffs. That would push the Executive back to Section 232 or 301 (which carry process predicates and narrower aims) and preserve Algonquin’s logic while limiting emergency-based tariff programs. Expect heavy reliance on major-questions reasoning (clear statement needed for tax-like powers). [21][8]
A middle path: The Court could permit targeted, time-limited IEEPA tariffs tightly tethered to a specific emergency (e.g., proven fentanyl-related supply chains) and subject to renewal findings closer to sanctions than revenue measures. That would salvage some executive agility while preventing “tariffs-as-tax” by proclamation. [13][19]
A broad approval (least likely given argument): If the Court buys the sanctions analogy fully, it could uphold IEEPA tariffs as “regulation” of import transactions during a declared emergency. Even then, expect a warning against permanent, economy-wide tariff policies without Congress. [13][14]
Interaction with Delegated Statutes
Whatever happens on IEEPA, the Court can reaffirm that Congress remains the constitutional principal in tariff policy and has provided other, more tailored routes. Section 232 remains viable post-Algonquin, though courts have policed timing and scope. Section 301 and 201 remain on the books with procedural guardrails. The question is whether emergencies allow the President to substitute IEEPA for those statutes. A restrictive reading would push the Executive branch back toward statutorily channeled tools – still dynamic, but with predicates that mirror congressional intent. [10][11][6]
How the Tariff Timeline fits
The Tax Project’s Historical Tariff timeline highlights the long arc: from tariffs as revenue (pre-16th Amendment) to tariffs as policy levers intertwined with MFN reciprocity, national security, and global bargaining. The current case is a stress test of that arc: can the delegation designed for emergencies displace the structured delegations of prior statutes and history built for trade bargaining? The Court’s skepticism may suggests corrective guidance: preserve executive agility where Congress outlined (Section 232/301), but require Congress, not emergencies, to authorize tax-like tariffs writ large at least within the major questions doctrine. That outcome would realign tariffs with their statutory channels without stripping the President of short-run leverage for discrete geopolitical threats, and the tactical implementation of negotiating parameters. [2][3][6]
Citations
[1] Brookings Institution, “Why does the executive branch have so much power over tariffs?” Jan 15, 2025. (Brookings) [2] CRS, “Presidential 2025 Tariff Actions: Timeline and Status,” Sept 16, 2025. (Congress.gov) [3] U.S. State Dept. Office of the Historian, “Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934).” (Office of the Historian) [4] House of Representatives History, “The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934.” (History, Art & Archives) [5] Irwin, “From Smoot-Hawley to Reciprocal Trade Agreements,” NBER chapter. (NBER) [6] CRS, “Presidential Authority to Address Tariff Barriers in Trade Agreements,” Sept 19, 2025. (Congress.gov) [7] USITC, “The Rise and Fall of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause.” (USITC) [8] Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, 426 U.S. 548 (1976). (Justia Law) [9] Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). (Justia Law) [10] SCOTUSblog, “American Institute for International Steel v. United States” (cert. denied, 2020). (SCOTUSblog) [11] CAFC, PrimeSource Building Products v. United States, opinion (Feb 7, 2023). (Federal Circuit Court) [12] CAFC, American Institute for International Steel summary/opinions (2020); see also CIT Slip Op. 19-37. (Federal Circuit Court) [13] POLITICO, “Justices appear skeptical of Trump’s broad tariffs,” Nov 5, 2025. (Politico) [14] The Guardian, “US Supreme Court justices express skepticism over legality of Trump tariffs,” Nov 4, 2025. (The Guardian) [15] ABC News, “Supreme Court hears Trump tariffs case,” Nov 5, 2025. (ABC News) [16] AP analysis, “A major question for the Supreme Court: Will it treat Trump as it did Biden?” Nov 4, 2025. (AP News) [17] CAFC, V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, opinion (Aug 29, 2025). (Federal Circuit Court) [18] Washington Post, “Trump officials ask Supreme Court to quickly allow sweeping tariffs,” Sept 4, 2025. (The Washington Post) [19] U.S. Solicitor General, Opening Brief in Gov’t v. V.O.S. Selections (IEEPA tariffs), No. 24-1287 (Sept 2025). (Supreme Court) [20] New York Post, “Supreme Court’s conservative justices pummel Trump admin on tariffs,” Nov 5, 2025. (New York Post)
The history of Tariffs is a history of the United States from early trade done by local British and Colonial import/exporters to the uniform standards of the Tariff Act of 1789 introduced by James Madison and advocated and implemented by Alexander Hamilton that became the primary revenue source for the young nation. From Congressional lists and schedules updated every 5-6 years by Congress to the dynamically negotiated agreements done by the Executive branch we have today. From an instrument of revenue to a tool for international trade, geopolitical power, and protection of National interests, Tariffs have been used throughout US History. From the disastrous effects of the Smoot-Hawley act to the triumphs of Post World War II Bretton Woods frameworks leading to our current Global Trade.
The First Congress establishes tariff duties as the primary federal revenue source. Congress sets detailed product-specific rates, leading to centralized customs collection at major ports.Significance
Major source of Revenue for United States
Establishes Congressional Authority over Tariffs
First attempt to standardize and provide uniformity to Tariffs across Colonies
Tariff Act of 1828 – a.k.a. Tariff of Abominations – Protective tariffs aimed at Northern industries cause tensions increasing cost of living in the South, leading to the Nullification Crisis when Vice President John Calhoun anonymously penned the Nullification Doctrine which emphasized a state’s right to reject federal laws within its borders and questioned the constitutionality of taxing imports without the explicit goal of raising revenue. Congress still sets rates but political conflicts highlight tariff complexity.
Significance
Establishes use of Tariffs as a Protectionism mechanism to protect domestic industry.
Establishes Congressional Authority over Tariffs
Created Political tension between the winners and losers of any Tariff policy.
The McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 was a high protective tariff raising rates on many imports. Congress remains central in setting rates, with protectionism as a goal. Introduces role of Executive Branch.
Significance
Introduced the concept of reciprocity, lowering tariffs if other country lowered theirs
Introduced role of Executive Branch to manage reciprocity agreements
Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 attempts reduction of rates on imported goods and introduces a federal income tax. The income tax is struck down by the Supreme Court until it was re introduced after the passage of the 16th Amendment in 1913, reinforcing tariffs role as major revenue in early America.
Significance
Reduced tariffs on imported goods, reflecting a shift towards lower tariffs
Introduced the concept of Income taxes to offset lower tariff revenue
Contributed to the debate on protectionism vs. free trade, impacting economic policy and government revenue sources.
Creation of the U.S. Tariff Commission: A bipartisan body established to advise Congress with expertise, marking increasing professionalization in tariff policy.
Significance
Predecessor to the US International Trade Commission (USITC)
Led by Frank Taussig, Harvard Professor
Created as part of the Revenue Act of 1916 which introduced Income Taxes
Replaced ad hoc lobby driven policies with analytic and scientific studies and recommendations
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act – further high tariff rates designed to help farmers exacerbate international trade tensions and the Great Depression. Congressional tariff-setting continues but criticism grows.
Significance
Started Global Trade War – caused retaliatory tariffs and significantly reduced International trade
Considered to contribute to worsening the Great Depression
Global trade levels dropped roughly 2/3rds from 1929 to 1934
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA): Congress delegates authority to the president to negotiate bilateral trade agreements and adjust tariffs within limits dynamically. Beginning of executive role in tariff management.
Significance
Congressional delegation of bilateral trade agreements to the Executive Branch
Allowed President to negotiate +/- 50% of existing Smoot-Hawley Tariff rates
Set Reciprocity as fundamental to negotiating Tariffs that US tariff cuts only if US got a cut in return
Moved Tariffs from Congressional lists to Executive bargaining
Unconditional Multi Lateral Most Favored Nation (MFN) clauses – if you cut Tariff X every country gets the best rate – default multi lateral
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) created a post World War II pact that set the rules for non-discriminatory, tariff-based trade among market economies.
Significance
Locked in Most Favored Nation non-discrimination (Article I): any tariff cut for one member extends to all.
Created bound tariff schedules (Article II), making cuts durable and harder to reverse.
Ran multilateral “rounds” that progressively lowered global tariffs.
Established early dispute settlement norms and a rules-based trading system.
Laid the institutional foundation for the World Trade Organization (WTO)
IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act) a 1977 U.S. law that lets the President, after declaring a national emergency tied to a foreign threat, block property and restrict transactions to protect national security, foreign policy, or the economy.
Significance
Requires the President to declare a national emergency about a foreign threat.
Allows assets to be frozen and block or allow specific transactions (through OFAC).
Common used for sanctions to limit trade and finance with certain countries, people, or sectors.
Executive branch must report to Congress, and courts can review.
Modern Trump tariffs: The Executive branch imposes broad tariffs using delegated authority and emergency powers to negotiate reciprocal deals. The deals create leverage for US interests, and represent a shift from multilateral deals to US first agreements.
Significance
Broad Tariffs as a negotiating tool in the strong Executive model of negotiation
Goal to reset trade expectations with partners where free trade is reciprocal
Used in geopolitical great power check to limit economic and military threat of potentially hostile peers
Leveraging Emergency Powers (IEEPA) to act on non trade and economic interests like Border Security, and Fentanyl enforcement.
The Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) is Congress’s principal enforcement mechanism for its constitutional “power of the purse.” It bars federal officials from obligating or expending funds in excess of, or in advance of, appropriations; prohibits acceptance of voluntary services (with narrow emergency exceptions); prohibits obligations in excess of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) apportionments; and requires agencies to report violations to the President and Congress. In modern shutdowns, these prohibitions are the legal force that halts non-excepted activities unless and until Congress enacts appropriations or a continuing resolution. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (limitations on expending/obligating), § 1342 (voluntary services), and § 1517 (apportionment violations) [1–3, 5–6].
The same framework also empowers the executive branch—principally through OMB—to direct operational shutdown steps and to meter spending during the year through apportionments and reserves under 31 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1513, subject to the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) oversight [4–6, 16].
Constitutional and Legal Foundations
Article I, § 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution provides: “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Congress operationalized that rule through the Anti-Deficiency Act, now largely codified through:
31 U.S.C. § 1341 (no obligations/expenditures above or before appropriations) [1].
31 U.S.C. § 1342 (no voluntary services except in narrow emergencies) [2].
31 U.S.C. §§ 1349–1351 (administrative sanctions and reporting to the President and Congress) [5].
31 U.S.C. §§ 1511–1519 (apportionment controls; violations of apportionment limits are ADA violations) [3–4].
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) calls the ADA one of the primary enforcement mechanisms of the appropriations framework, and its Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (“Red Book”) treats it as the backbone of budget execution discipline [6].
History: How and Why the ADA came about
1860s – 1880s: Origins, the problem of “Coercive Deficiencies”
After the Civil War and through the late 19th century, agencies (notably in the War and Navy Departments) developed the habit of entering obligations without available appropriations and then pressuring Congress to provide supplemental funds after the fact—so-called “coercive deficiencies.” Congress responded first with an 1870 appropriations rider (Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 7, 16 Stat. 251), later reenacted as Revised Statutes § 3679—the antecedent to today’s ADA [10]. Congress strengthened the regime in 1884 and again in 1905–1906 by adding the apportionment discipline and penalties, so agencies could not front-load obligations and then create deficiencies (1905: 33 Stat. 1257; 1906 added criminal penalties) [9–10].
Sponsors and partisanship: The 19th-century Anti-Deficiency restrictions were riders to large appropriations bills carried by floor managers rather than single named sponsors. The emphasis was institutional control, not partisan signature [9–10]. Riders are provisions to larger bills, often used as policy bargains hitched to bills to insure passage of legislation (often appropriations).
1930s–1950: toward a modern control system
As executive budgeting centralized (Bureau of the Budget (BOB), predecessor to OMB), Congress overhauled execution rules in the General Appropriation Act of 1951 (enacted 1950). Those changes formalized apportionment authority and prohibited obligations in excess of apportionments—now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1517—and allowed limited reserves to realize savings [3, 10]. Legislative histories note Rep. William F. Norrell (D-AR) as a House sponsor/manager of key 1950 execution amendments—an indicator of bipartisan, process-oriented reform rather than a partisan initiative [11].
1982: positive-law codification (bipartisan and executive-signed)
In 1982 Congress enacted Title 31 as positive law (Pub. L. 97-258) to “revise, codify, and enact without substantive change” existing fiscal statutes—including the ADA—into the structure we use today. The bill H.R. 6128 was sponsored by Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D-NJ), cleared both chambers by voice/unanimous consent, and was signed by President Ronald Reagan (Sept. 13, 1982) [12].
1990: narrowing the “emergency” exception (OBRA-90)
Responding to disputes over the scope of “emergencies,” Congress amended 31 U.S.C. § 1342 in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA-90) to state that “emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property” do not include “ongoing, regular functions of government” whose suspension would not imminently threaten those interests. OBRA-90 was sponsored by Rep. Leon Panetta (D-CA) and signed by President George H. W. Bush (Nov. 5, 1990) [2, 13].
Summary: Modern legal framework
What the ADA prohibits and requires
No obligations/expenditures above or before appropriations. Officials may not “make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available” or “involve the Government in a contract… before an appropriation is made,” unless otherwise authorized by law. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 [1].
No voluntary services. Agencies may not accept voluntary services or employ personal services beyond those authorized by law, except for bona fide emergencies involving safety of human life or protection of property, as narrowly defined in the 1990 amendment. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 [2, 13].
No obligations against apportionments. Even with an appropriation, agencies cannot obligate/spend above OMB apportionments or allocations; violating an apportionment is itself an ADA violation. 31 U.S.C. § 1517 [3–4].
Mandatory reporting. Agency heads must report ADA violations to the President and Congress, with a copy to GAO, detailing facts and corrective actions. 31 U.S.C. § 1351; GAO publishes compilations and guidance [5–6].
Sanctions. Administrative discipline (including suspension/removal) applies for violations; knowing and willful violations of key provisions carry criminal penalties under 31 U.S.C. § 1350. Criminal prosecutions are rare; agencies usually impose administrative remedies and procedural fixes [5–6, 18–20].
GAO’s Red Book underscores that the ADA, combined with purpose/time/amount restrictions, is how Congress ensures the executive uses funds only as appropriated [6].
How the ADA governs Shutdowns and empowers Government Branches
The Shutdown logic
When an appropriation lapses, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 bars incurring obligations for affected activities; § 1342 bars acceptance of voluntary services; and § 1517 bars obligations in excess of apportionments. The only work that can lawfully continue is (i) authorized by law (e.g., multi-year/no-year funds, user-fee accounts, mandatory programs), (ii) falls within the narrow emergency exception of § 1342, or (iii) is necessary for an orderly shutdown [1–4, 14].
The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) articulated the modern framework in the Civiletti opinions (1981) and a 1995 OLC memo refining the emergency and “necessary implication” doctrines; both are the basis for today’s practice [8–9, 14]. OMB Circular A-11, Section 124 operationalizes shutdowns: agencies must keep current lapse/contingency plans, and, once a lapse occurs, OMB directs initiation of orderly shutdown activities. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) furlough guidance aligns with A-11: non-excepted employees are placed on shutdown furlough; “excepted” personnel perform only those duties necessary to protect life/property or to support legally funded programs; and employees may not volunteer to work prohibited duties [6–7, 15].
Bottom line: the ADA is the legal brake that halts most operations during a lapse; OMB and OPM provide the playbook for how to stop [1–4, 6–7, 9].
Legislative branch (Congress) Power during shutdown
1) Hard stop without appropriations. The House and Senate control whether operations continue by enacting appropriations or a continuing resolution. The ADA makes non-excepted obligations unlawful absent that legislative action. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 [1, 6, 8–9].
2) Control through conditions and time limits. Congress can embed caps and conditions; exceeding those limitations can itself be an ADA violation, per OLC (e.g., “not to exceed” caps). This gives Congress fine-grained policy control via riders [5, 36].
3) Oversight leverage via mandatory reporting. ADA reporting to the President, Congress, and GAO gives committees a direct oversight tool. 31 U.S.C. § 1351; GAO ADA portal [5–6].
Executive branch (President & OMB) Power during shutdown
1) Direction of shutdown execution (procedural control). Under OMB Circular A-11, Section 124, OMB tells agencies when to initiate orderly shutdown steps, what must be in contingency plans, and how to classify activities as exempt (legally funded) or excepted (narrow emergency/necessary implication). Agencies act through those plans; OMB coordinates. This is a real (though bounded) form of executive operational power during a lapse [6–7].
2) Apportionment power – year-round metering of obligations. Outside a lapse, OMB uses apportionments to meter how much of an appropriation is available to obligate (by quarter, project, or activity) to avoid deficiencies and ensure economical execution. That authority is grounded in 31 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1513. If an agency obligates above an apportionment (or agency subdivision limits under § 1514 regulations), it violates § 1517, an ADA breach reportable to Congress and the President [3–4].
3) “Necessary implication” and defining excepted functions (during lapses). OLC’s 1981/1995 opinions recognize that some functions must continue when other statutes would be defeated without supporting work (e.g., to protect life/property, maintain constitutional functions, or support ongoing legally funded activities). OMB/agency plans translate those legal standards into concrete “excepted” workforces. This is a gatekeeping role – OMB and agencies decide what qualifies, but their discretion is cabined by the narrow 1990 definition in § 1342 and OLC’s tests [2, 8–9].
4) Limits: the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) and GAO review. OMB’s apportionment and reserve tools cannot be used to effectuate policy deferrals or impoundments that Congress has not authorized. GAO concluded OMB violated the ICA when it withheld Ukraine security assistance by footnoting apportionments to make funds temporarily unavailable for obligation; OMB disputed GAO’s view, but the decision remains a prominent constraint on using apportionments to pursue policy ends [16].
5) Live leverage examples. Shutdown-era guidance—such as how OMB and agencies describe eligibility for work vs furlough, or the expectation of back pay under the Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019—can shape the negotiating environment even while remaining bounded by statute. The key takeaway is that procedural control (sequencing, classifications, pacing) gives the Executive Branch influence, while substantive authority (whether money exists) remains Congress’s [6–7, 14–16].
Net: The ADA constrains the executive from operating beyond legal funding, but within that constraint OMB exercises material procedural and timing control—both during lapses (sequencing shutdown and defining excepted functions) and during execution (apportionments). Congress retains the decisive substantive control: whether, when, and on what conditions funds exist at all [1–6, 8–9, 16].
Enforcement, Reporting, and Consequences
Enforcement: Agencies manage (often via the agency’s Office of Inspector General, OIG) whether an Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violation occurred, impose administrative discipline, and file the mandatory report to the President and Congress under 31 U.S.C. § 1351. The OMB polices execution through apportionments and Circular A-11; exceeding an apportionment is itself an ADA violation that the agency must report. The GAO provides independent legal decisions, audits, and publishes ADA violation compliance reports, but does not enforce
Reporting: Agencies must report ADA violations to the President and Congress, with a copy to GAO, including facts, causes, and corrective actions. GAO maintains public resources and compilations. 31 U.S.C. § 1351; GAO ADA resources [5–6, 32–34].
Consequences: Administrative discipline (suspension/removal) is typical for negligent management errors; 31 U.S.C. § 1350 provides criminal penalties for knowing, willful violations. (Judge Advocate General [JAG] practice notes describe administrative discipline under a strict-liability standard for the underlying breach, with mens rea (must show specific intent) required only for criminal cases.) [5, 18–20] For criminal cases (rare), the Department of Justice (DOJ) – typically through U.S. Attorneys – prosecutes knowing and willful violations referred by an agency/OIG (sometimes flagged by GAO or OMB). Congress receives § 1351 reports, conducts hearings and oversight, and can tighten or condition future appropriations reinforcing accountability across the system.
Controversies and recurring Gray areas
The ADA is not without controversy, when a shutdown occurs, interpretations of the statutes create gray areas that each party and branch may try to exploit.
Scope of “necessary implication” and “authorized by law.” OLC recognizes some functions must continue when other statutes would be defeated without supporting work. Critics argue agencies occasionally read these exceptions too broadly; Congress narrowed § 1342 in 1990 to tether “emergency” to imminent threats [2, 9, 13].
What counts as “protection of property/life.” The line between routine operations and true emergencies is fact-bound. Agencies must document why a function is excepted in their A-11 plans; OMB reviews [6–7, 9].
Internal caps and conditions as ADA triggers. Department of Justice OLC has advised that exceeding internal caps or conditions embedded in an appropriation can itself constitute an ADA violation—giving Congress fine-grained policy control via riders [36].
Shutdown employment practices and back pay. The Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019 (GEFTA) requires post-lapse compensation; how agencies and OMB frame the mechanics can affect expectations and pressure, but cannot override statute [14–15].
Apportionment overreach vs. execution discipline.31 U.S.C. § 1512 requires apportionment to prevent deficiencies and ensure economy; § 1517 makes exceeding apportionments an ADA violation. Used correctly, it’s neutral budget discipline; used to delay or condition funds for policy, it risks ICA violations [3–4, 16].
Practical takeaways (for practitioners and watchdogs)
During a lapse, assume “stop” unless funded or excepted. The default is to halt affected work; exceptions exist but are narrow, documented in agency plans, and coordinated with OMB. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342; OMB A-11 § 124 [1–2, 6–7].
Multi-year/no-year funds are a lifeline—but still subject to apportionment. Activities with unexpired prior-year or permanent appropriations can continue if legally available and within apportionments. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1512–1513 [3–4].
Don’t accept “free help.” Voluntary services generally violate § 1342 unless an explicit, lawful authority applies; otherwise you can create an implied claim for pay [2, 35].
Exceeding an apportionment is an ADA violation, even if the appropriation has funds left. That is § 1517 in action [3–4].
Congress’s leverage is structural; OMB’s leverage is procedural. Congress decides whether and on what terms funds exist; OMB controls sequencing and the pace of execution within those terms (subject to ICA limits) [1–6, 16].
Conclusion
The Anti-Deficiency Act provides the operational legal framework for Congress control over Federal spending, the so called “Power of the Purse”. Born to end Coercive Deficiencies and strengthened with apportionments and reporting, it ensures that Federal officials/agencies cannot obligate or expend funds without legislative authorization. In governs Government shutdown activities: non-excepted activities must stop. It provides Congress leverage and control via appropriations/funding. At the same time, the ADA’s architecture (as implemented by OMB through A-11 and by agencies via contingency plans) gives the Executive branch real procedural power to direct how a shutdown is managed and how funds are metered during the year—bounded by statute, OLC opinions, and the Impoundment Control Act, and monitored by GAO [1–6, 8–9, 16]. For more, see our article on the Federal Budget Process.
Citations
[1] 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (limitations on expending/obligating amounts), Legal Information Institute. [2] 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (limitation on voluntary services; 1990 amendment narrowing emergencies), Legal Information Institute. [3] 31 U.S.C. § 1517 (prohibited obligations and expenditures in excess of apportionments), Legal Information Institute. [4] 31 U.S.C. § 1512 (apportionment and reserves) and § 1513 (officials controlling apportionments), Legal Information Institute. [5] 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349–1351 (administrative discipline; criminal penalties; reporting), govinfo/LII. [6] GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (“Red Book”) and ADA overview pages (role of ADA as primary enforcement). [7] OMB Circular A-11 (current), Section 124—Agency Operations in the Absence of Appropriations (shutdown procedures and OMB direction). [8] OLC (1981) “Civiletti” Opinion—Authority for the continuation of government functions during a lapse in appropriations. [9] OLC (1995) Memorandum—Government Operations in the Event of a Lapse in Appropriations (refining “necessary implication” and emergency tests). [10] Historical summaries of 1870/1884/1905–06 Anti-Deficiency provisions and their aims (ending “coercive deficiencies”). [11] Legislative notes indicating Rep. William F. Norrell (D-AR) as a sponsor/manager of the 1950 execution amendments. [12] Pub. L. 97-258 (Sept. 13, 1982): Positive-law codification of Title 31; H.R. 6128 sponsored by Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D-NJ); signed by President Reagan. [13] OBRA-90 change to 31 U.S.C. § 1342—narrowing “emergency”; H.R. 5835 sponsored by Rep. Leon Panetta (D-CA); signed by President George H. W. Bush. [14] OMB/agency shutdown contingency plans and OPM furlough guidance aligning with ADA and A-11. [15] Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019 (back-pay baseline after lapses). [16] GAO decisions on apportionment/ICA (e.g., Ukraine assistance), constraining OMB’s use of apportionments for policy ends. [18] 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (administrative discipline). [19] 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (criminal penalties). [20] Agency ADA violation compilations and GAO reporting instructions (annual ADA reports). [32–36] Additional GAO decisions and DOJ OLC advisories on voluntary services, internal caps, and shutdown boundaries (for deeper case-by-case applications).
Whether you love or loathe the Trump administration or Elon Musk, one thing’s for sure: the DOGE platform is changing the game on government transparency.
The DOGE website was a big step forward in transparency, but we’ve dialed it up to 11. The Tax Project’s DOGE Savings App gives you unprecedented access to:
Transactional-level detail on DOGE savings items
Real-time savings data straight from DOGE systems
Interactive visualizations like you’ve never seen before
No spreadsheets. Not just summaries. Just raw, searchable, visually intuitive, actionable insight.
Controversial?
DOGE for better or worse, has been the subject of a ton of controversy for sure, but this isn’t about politics — it’s about progress. Love them or hate them, DOGE has blown open the black box of government finance. The fact that this data is being exposed at all is a huge leap forward for Transparency and Open Government.
And with the DOGE API, anyone can build, analyze, or audit. That’s radical transparency — no matter what side you’re on. At the Tax Project, we’re about showing the data, and let informed citizens come up with their own opinions. You’re the boss, we just serve the data.
Why it Matters?
Track DOGE identified savings
Dig into who’s spending what — and where
See where the cuts are coming from
See which Agencies took the biggest cuts
See how much was spent on Vendors and how much was cut
Look at Contracts, Grants, and Lease details
Drill down into interactive Visual Charts
Support Transparency. Be Informed.
The DOGE Savings App is coming, and this is our Pre Release. Transparency is trending. Are you in?
Tax Project Institute is a fiscally sponsored project of MarinLink, a California non-profit corporation exempt from federal tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Service #20-0879422.