Anti-Deficiency Act: History and Functions
The Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) is Congress’s principal enforcement mechanism for its constitutional “power of the purse.” It bars federal officials from obligating or expending funds in excess of, or in advance of, appropriations; prohibits acceptance of voluntary services (with narrow emergency exceptions); prohibits obligations in excess of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) apportionments; and requires agencies to report violations to the President and Congress. In modern shutdowns, these prohibitions are the legal force that halts non-excepted activities unless and until Congress enacts appropriations or a continuing resolution. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (limitations on expending/obligating), § 1342 (voluntary services), and § 1517 (apportionment violations) [1–3, 5–6].
The same framework also empowers the executive branch—principally through OMB—to direct operational shutdown steps and to meter spending during the year through apportionments and reserves under 31 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1513, subject to the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) oversight [4–6, 16].
Constitutional and Legal Foundations
Article I, § 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution provides: “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Congress operationalized that rule through the Anti-Deficiency Act, now largely codified through:
- 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (no obligations/expenditures above or before appropriations) [1].
- 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (no voluntary services except in narrow emergencies) [2].
- 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349–1351 (administrative sanctions and reporting to the President and Congress) [5].
- 31 U.S.C. §§ 1511–1519 (apportionment controls; violations of apportionment limits are ADA violations) [3–4].
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) calls the ADA one of the primary enforcement mechanisms of the appropriations framework, and its Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (“Red Book”) treats it as the backbone of budget execution discipline [6].
History: How and Why the ADA came about
1860s – 1880s: Origins, the problem of “Coercive Deficiencies”
After the Civil War and through the late 19th century, agencies (notably in the War and Navy Departments) developed the habit of entering obligations without available appropriations and then pressuring Congress to provide supplemental funds after the fact—so-called “coercive deficiencies.” Congress responded first with an 1870 appropriations rider (Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 7, 16 Stat. 251), later reenacted as Revised Statutes § 3679—the antecedent to today’s ADA [10]. Congress strengthened the regime in 1884 and again in 1905–1906 by adding the apportionment discipline and penalties, so agencies could not front-load obligations and then create deficiencies (1905: 33 Stat. 1257; 1906 added criminal penalties) [9–10].
Sponsors and partisanship: The 19th-century Anti-Deficiency restrictions were riders to large appropriations bills carried by floor managers rather than single named sponsors. The emphasis was institutional control, not partisan signature [9–10]. Riders are provisions to larger bills, often used as policy bargains hitched to bills to insure passage of legislation (often appropriations).
1930s–1950: toward a modern control system
As executive budgeting centralized (Bureau of the Budget (BOB), predecessor to OMB), Congress overhauled execution rules in the General Appropriation Act of 1951 (enacted 1950). Those changes formalized apportionment authority and prohibited obligations in excess of apportionments—now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1517—and allowed limited reserves to realize savings [3, 10]. Legislative histories note Rep. William F. Norrell (D-AR) as a House sponsor/manager of key 1950 execution amendments—an indicator of bipartisan, process-oriented reform rather than a partisan initiative [11].
1982: positive-law codification (bipartisan and executive-signed)
In 1982 Congress enacted Title 31 as positive law (Pub. L. 97-258) to “revise, codify, and enact without substantive change” existing fiscal statutes—including the ADA—into the structure we use today. The bill H.R. 6128 was sponsored by Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D-NJ), cleared both chambers by voice/unanimous consent, and was signed by President Ronald Reagan (Sept. 13, 1982) [12].
1990: narrowing the “emergency” exception (OBRA-90)
Responding to disputes over the scope of “emergencies,” Congress amended 31 U.S.C. § 1342 in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA-90) to state that “emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property” do not include “ongoing, regular functions of government” whose suspension would not imminently threaten those interests. OBRA-90 was sponsored by Rep. Leon Panetta (D-CA) and signed by President George H. W. Bush (Nov. 5, 1990) [2, 13].
Summary: Modern legal framework
What the ADA prohibits and requires
- No obligations/expenditures above or before appropriations. Officials may not “make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available” or “involve the Government in a contract… before an appropriation is made,” unless otherwise authorized by law. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 [1].
- No voluntary services. Agencies may not accept voluntary services or employ personal services beyond those authorized by law, except for bona fide emergencies involving safety of human life or protection of property, as narrowly defined in the 1990 amendment. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 [2, 13].
- No obligations against apportionments. Even with an appropriation, agencies cannot obligate/spend above OMB apportionments or allocations; violating an apportionment is itself an ADA violation. 31 U.S.C. § 1517 [3–4].
- Mandatory reporting. Agency heads must report ADA violations to the President and Congress, with a copy to GAO, detailing facts and corrective actions. 31 U.S.C. § 1351; GAO publishes compilations and guidance [5–6].
- Sanctions. Administrative discipline (including suspension/removal) applies for violations; knowing and willful violations of key provisions carry criminal penalties under 31 U.S.C. § 1350. Criminal prosecutions are rare; agencies usually impose administrative remedies and procedural fixes [5–6, 18–20].
GAO’s Red Book underscores that the ADA, combined with purpose/time/amount restrictions, is how Congress ensures the executive uses funds only as appropriated [6].
How the ADA governs Shutdowns and empowers Government Branches
The Shutdown logic
When an appropriation lapses, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 bars incurring obligations for affected activities; § 1342 bars acceptance of voluntary services; and § 1517 bars obligations in excess of apportionments. The only work that can lawfully continue is (i) authorized by law (e.g., multi-year/no-year funds, user-fee accounts, mandatory programs), (ii) falls within the narrow emergency exception of § 1342, or (iii) is necessary for an orderly shutdown [1–4, 14].
The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) articulated the modern framework in the Civiletti opinions (1981) and a 1995 OLC memo refining the emergency and “necessary implication” doctrines; both are the basis for today’s practice [8–9, 14]. OMB Circular A-11, Section 124 operationalizes shutdowns: agencies must keep current lapse/contingency plans, and, once a lapse occurs, OMB directs initiation of orderly shutdown activities. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) furlough guidance aligns with A-11: non-excepted employees are placed on shutdown furlough; “excepted” personnel perform only those duties necessary to protect life/property or to support legally funded programs; and employees may not volunteer to work prohibited duties [6–7, 15].
Bottom line: the ADA is the legal brake that halts most operations during a lapse; OMB and OPM provide the playbook for how to stop [1–4, 6–7, 9].
Legislative branch (Congress) Power during shutdown
1) Hard stop without appropriations.
The House and Senate control whether operations continue by enacting appropriations or a continuing resolution. The ADA makes non-excepted obligations unlawful absent that legislative action. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 [1, 6, 8–9].
2) Control through conditions and time limits.
Congress can embed caps and conditions; exceeding those limitations can itself be an ADA violation, per OLC (e.g., “not to exceed” caps). This gives Congress fine-grained policy control via riders [5, 36].
3) Oversight leverage via mandatory reporting.
ADA reporting to the President, Congress, and GAO gives committees a direct oversight tool. 31 U.S.C. § 1351; GAO ADA portal [5–6].
Executive branch (President & OMB) Power during shutdown
1) Direction of shutdown execution (procedural control).
Under OMB Circular A-11, Section 124, OMB tells agencies when to initiate orderly shutdown steps, what must be in contingency plans, and how to classify activities as exempt (legally funded) or excepted (narrow emergency/necessary implication). Agencies act through those plans; OMB coordinates. This is a real (though bounded) form of executive operational power during a lapse [6–7].
2) Apportionment power – year-round metering of obligations.
Outside a lapse, OMB uses apportionments to meter how much of an appropriation is available to obligate (by quarter, project, or activity) to avoid deficiencies and ensure economical execution. That authority is grounded in 31 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1513. If an agency obligates above an apportionment (or agency subdivision limits under § 1514 regulations), it violates § 1517, an ADA breach reportable to Congress and the President [3–4].
3) “Necessary implication” and defining excepted functions (during lapses).
OLC’s 1981/1995 opinions recognize that some functions must continue when other statutes would be defeated without supporting work (e.g., to protect life/property, maintain constitutional functions, or support ongoing legally funded activities). OMB/agency plans translate those legal standards into concrete “excepted” workforces. This is a gatekeeping role – OMB and agencies decide what qualifies, but their discretion is cabined by the narrow 1990 definition in § 1342 and OLC’s tests [2, 8–9].
4) Limits: the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) and GAO review.
OMB’s apportionment and reserve tools cannot be used to effectuate policy deferrals or impoundments that Congress has not authorized. GAO concluded OMB violated the ICA when it withheld Ukraine security assistance by footnoting apportionments to make funds temporarily unavailable for obligation; OMB disputed GAO’s view, but the decision remains a prominent constraint on using apportionments to pursue policy ends [16].
5) Live leverage examples.
Shutdown-era guidance—such as how OMB and agencies describe eligibility for work vs furlough, or the expectation of back pay under the Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019—can shape the negotiating environment even while remaining bounded by statute. The key takeaway is that procedural control (sequencing, classifications, pacing) gives the Executive Branch influence, while substantive authority (whether money exists) remains Congress’s [6–7, 14–16].
Net: The ADA constrains the executive from operating beyond legal funding, but within that constraint OMB exercises material procedural and timing control—both during lapses (sequencing shutdown and defining excepted functions) and during execution (apportionments). Congress retains the decisive substantive control: whether, when, and on what conditions funds exist at all [1–6, 8–9, 16].
Enforcement, Reporting, and Consequences
Enforcement: Agencies manage (often via the agency’s Office of Inspector General, OIG) whether an Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violation occurred, impose administrative discipline, and file the mandatory report to the President and Congress under 31 U.S.C. § 1351. The OMB polices execution through apportionments and Circular A-11; exceeding an apportionment is itself an ADA violation that the agency must report. The GAO provides independent legal decisions, audits, and publishes ADA violation compliance reports, but does not enforce
Reporting: Agencies must report ADA violations to the President and Congress, with a copy to GAO, including facts, causes, and corrective actions. GAO maintains public resources and compilations. 31 U.S.C. § 1351; GAO ADA resources [5–6, 32–34].
Consequences: Administrative discipline (suspension/removal) is typical for negligent management errors; 31 U.S.C. § 1350 provides criminal penalties for knowing, willful violations. (Judge Advocate General [JAG] practice notes describe administrative discipline under a strict-liability standard for the underlying breach, with mens rea (must show specific intent) required only for criminal cases.) [5, 18–20] For criminal cases (rare), the Department of Justice (DOJ) – typically through U.S. Attorneys – prosecutes knowing and willful violations referred by an agency/OIG (sometimes flagged by GAO or OMB). Congress receives § 1351 reports, conducts hearings and oversight, and can tighten or condition future appropriations reinforcing accountability across the system.
Controversies and recurring Gray areas
The ADA is not without controversy, when a shutdown occurs, interpretations of the statutes create gray areas that each party and branch may try to exploit.
- Scope of “necessary implication” and “authorized by law.” OLC recognizes some functions must continue when other statutes would be defeated without supporting work. Critics argue agencies occasionally read these exceptions too broadly; Congress narrowed § 1342 in 1990 to tether “emergency” to imminent threats [2, 9, 13].
- What counts as “protection of property/life.” The line between routine operations and true emergencies is fact-bound. Agencies must document why a function is excepted in their A-11 plans; OMB reviews [6–7, 9].
- Internal caps and conditions as ADA triggers. Department of Justice OLC has advised that exceeding internal caps or conditions embedded in an appropriation can itself constitute an ADA violation—giving Congress fine-grained policy control via riders [36].
- Shutdown employment practices and back pay. The Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019 (GEFTA) requires post-lapse compensation; how agencies and OMB frame the mechanics can affect expectations and pressure, but cannot override statute [14–15].
- Apportionment overreach vs. execution discipline. 31 U.S.C. § 1512 requires apportionment to prevent deficiencies and ensure economy; § 1517 makes exceeding apportionments an ADA violation. Used correctly, it’s neutral budget discipline; used to delay or condition funds for policy, it risks ICA violations [3–4, 16].
Practical takeaways (for practitioners and watchdogs)
- During a lapse, assume “stop” unless funded or excepted. The default is to halt affected work; exceptions exist but are narrow, documented in agency plans, and coordinated with OMB. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342; OMB A-11 § 124 [1–2, 6–7].
- Multi-year/no-year funds are a lifeline—but still subject to apportionment. Activities with unexpired prior-year or permanent appropriations can continue if legally available and within apportionments. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1512–1513 [3–4].
- Don’t accept “free help.” Voluntary services generally violate § 1342 unless an explicit, lawful authority applies; otherwise you can create an implied claim for pay [2, 35].
- Exceeding an apportionment is an ADA violation, even if the appropriation has funds left. That is § 1517 in action [3–4].
- Congress’s leverage is structural; OMB’s leverage is procedural. Congress decides whether and on what terms funds exist; OMB controls sequencing and the pace of execution within those terms (subject to ICA limits) [1–6, 16].
Conclusion
The Anti-Deficiency Act provides the operational legal framework for Congress control over Federal spending, the so called “Power of the Purse”. Born to end Coercive Deficiencies and strengthened with apportionments and reporting, it ensures that Federal officials/agencies cannot obligate or expend funds without legislative authorization. In governs Government shutdown activities: non-excepted activities must stop. It provides Congress leverage and control via appropriations/funding. At the same time, the ADA’s architecture (as implemented by OMB through A-11 and by agencies via contingency plans) gives the Executive branch real procedural power to direct how a shutdown is managed and how funds are metered during the year—bounded by statute, OLC opinions, and the Impoundment Control Act, and monitored by GAO [1–6, 8–9, 16]. For more, see our article on the Federal Budget Process.
Citations
[1] 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (limitations on expending/obligating amounts), Legal Information Institute.
[2] 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (limitation on voluntary services; 1990 amendment narrowing emergencies), Legal Information Institute.
[3] 31 U.S.C. § 1517 (prohibited obligations and expenditures in excess of apportionments), Legal Information Institute.
[4] 31 U.S.C. § 1512 (apportionment and reserves) and § 1513 (officials controlling apportionments), Legal Information Institute.
[5] 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349–1351 (administrative discipline; criminal penalties; reporting), govinfo/LII.
[6] GAO, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (“Red Book”) and ADA overview pages (role of ADA as primary enforcement).
[7] OMB Circular A-11 (current), Section 124—Agency Operations in the Absence of Appropriations (shutdown procedures and OMB direction).
[8] OLC (1981) “Civiletti” Opinion—Authority for the continuation of government functions during a lapse in appropriations.
[9] OLC (1995) Memorandum—Government Operations in the Event of a Lapse in Appropriations (refining “necessary implication” and emergency tests).
[10] Historical summaries of 1870/1884/1905–06 Anti-Deficiency provisions and their aims (ending “coercive deficiencies”).
[11] Legislative notes indicating Rep. William F. Norrell (D-AR) as a sponsor/manager of the 1950 execution amendments.
[12] Pub. L. 97-258 (Sept. 13, 1982): Positive-law codification of Title 31; H.R. 6128 sponsored by Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D-NJ); signed by President Reagan.
[13] OBRA-90 change to 31 U.S.C. § 1342—narrowing “emergency”; H.R. 5835 sponsored by Rep. Leon Panetta (D-CA); signed by President George H. W. Bush.
[14] OMB/agency shutdown contingency plans and OPM furlough guidance aligning with ADA and A-11.
[15] Government Employee Fair Treatment Act of 2019 (back-pay baseline after lapses).
[16] GAO decisions on apportionment/ICA (e.g., Ukraine assistance), constraining OMB’s use of apportionments for policy ends.
[18] 31 U.S.C. § 1349 (administrative discipline).
[19] 31 U.S.C. § 1350 (criminal penalties).
[20] Agency ADA violation compilations and GAO reporting instructions (annual ADA reports).
[32–36] Additional GAO decisions and DOJ OLC advisories on voluntary services, internal caps, and shutdown boundaries (for deeper case-by-case applications).



